

Freedom of movement and conservation of the diversity of culture: The territoriality principle vs. the personality principle¹

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Thank you very much for your attendance today.

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to *L'Université libre de Bruxelles* (ULB), who have kindly facilitated this seminar. I am greatly honoured to speak at this university, *L'Université d'Europe*, which has educated a lot of key persons who have been committed to achieving global peace, such as, the international advocate Henri-Marie La Fontaine (1854-1943), who held a difficult post as the Director-General of *Bureau international permanent de la paix* during a most challenging era: from 1907 to 1943.

Firstly, I would like to clarify my stance towards the European Union. I personally consider the system and the structure of the EU as the model for the future of East Asia. As such, I eagerly approve of the EU in general.

However, even for someone like myself from the Confucian cultural sphere, where obsequiousness is thought to be a virtue, I still fear the dangers. If I were to pinpoint the reason behind such scepticisms, it would be through the following question: is the EU a vanguard leading universal human rights that will eventually be extended to the whole world, or is it merely a swollen "Gargantua" of modern territoriality.

Meanwhile, I am left asking myself such a question, and it would please me if it would generate discussion.

1. The huge exterior wall of the European Union: Is the EU an avatar of territoriality?

Undoubtedly the future of the EU is tightly linked to that of other nations, namely, Maghreb countries, Egypt, Turkey, Serbia, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the vast number of nations in Asia and Africa. Above all, in early 2011, at this very instant

the flames of revolution are surrounding the EU's extensive wall, with the Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution taking place just beyond the tip of Italy's toe. Keeping in touch via mobile and portable communication tools delivered from inside the EU, for the first time the participants of these movements have in their hands a strong method to claim "Liberté, égalité, fraternité" without boundaries. Yet, one side effect could be a flood of political and economic refugees heading towards the EU.

Under these circumstances, the images of the Spanish exclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla in Maghreb (Morocco) inevitably come to mind, where tall and lofty walls stand between the innumerable illegal immigrants and the EU fortress. Also, according to news reports in 2010, a concrete fence alongside the Evros River has been considered in order to separate the EU (Greece) from European Turkey, as the European version of the Wet-backs. The thought of an actual, visual and physical wall, brings back the giant Gargantua as an enforced representation of the Modern era in Europe. These walls could become parts of curtains separating other parts of the world, as did the former *Iron* or *Bamboo* curtains.

Napoleon spread the motto "Liberté, égalité, fraternité" by force all over the world with a huge sacrifice of real people. Even though they eventually overcame such bitter experiences, European citizens are still estimating the value of that motto and trying to form a Public Sphere within the EU where such mottos are common principles. It seems, however, that they have given up expanding the frontiers of this sphere beyond the same area where Christianity had spread, as was the approach during the Middle Ages.

This would be rather ironic, considering that Europeans mean to separate religion from politics in the Modern era.

Some argue that the bedrock of Europe is formed by the values of Christianity and anyone not sharing such concepts should not be admitted to the EU. The process of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2000/2001-) was marked by this standpoint. In fact, contrary to the suggestions of Pope John Paul II or the government of Poland, the term "Christianity" is not expressly referred to in the wording of the Treaty. However, the proposal for the European Constitution in 2004 started with the following in its Preamble:

DRAWING INSPIRATION from cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of

Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, (emphasis added)

These words are kept unchanged in the Lisbon Treaty, (by the words: “the following text shall be inserted as the second recital”), even though the treaty of 2004 was rejected and required further reform after unfavourable results in referenda held in France and the Netherlands.

It is remarkably symbolic that the signing ceremony of the Lisbon Treaty (December 13th, 2007) was held at the Monastery of Jerónimos, which happens to be the most eminent building of the Roman Catholic Church in Portugal.

Just as noticeable are the words of the former French President (1974-81), Giscard d'Estaing (1928-), chairman of the committee set up to draft a European Constitution, the European Convention on the Future of Europe. In an interview with “Le Monde” (November 8th, 2002) he says that:

-- Turkey's capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of its population lives outside Europe, and it is not a *European country*.

-- In my opinion, it would be the end of Europe (referring to the idea of including Turkey in a future wave of European enlargement).

In the light of a subsequent interview, given by d'Estaing years later on April 4th, 2005 in “Le Figaro”, I think that the above statements are not to be construed as merely personal or light-hearted remarks. In this interview, it is said that:

Pope John Paul II strongly insisted on referring to “Christianity” at the negotiation of the documentation of the European Constitution that I refused since it was impossible to have the approval of Constitution by 25 countries.

By these facts, the sentence “Inspiration from the religious inheritance of Europe” in the Preamble to the European Constitution (which is the current wording in the Lisbon Treaty) does not reflect the plural religions which have been existing in Europe over the ages, such as Animism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, but instead implies there is one single dominant religion, Christianity. Hence, after the difficult discussion

about whether or not the term itself was to be expressly mentioned, one might think it ended up being avoided too obviously.

Furthermore, to what extent does the EU mean to assume a role in the revival of the Roman Catholic Christendom and the integration of Roman Catholic, Protestants and Orthodox churches? Beyond those, there are innumerable immigrants who have been transferred to the EU zone – are they doomed to be religious aliens? All this is very curious for people who are considering the East Asian Community, where the diversities are much more varied than Europe, including religious realities.

I myself wish and expect the EU citizens to have enough ambition to expand European peace keeping to the whole world. In other words, I hope that the *pathos* which unites Europe could turn to be the *logos* to unite the world.

In Japanese, there are two words “Issho-Kenmei” and “Isshō-Kenmei”. I do not know if you can distinguish by my pronunciation but the superficial meaning is the same; both basically mean “with all one’s might”. For us, however, the subtle nuances between these two words give rise to two quite different meanings. “Issho-Kenmei” originates from the samurai protecting their own territory by all means possible. This word can be viewed as a symbol of territoriality. Nowadays this word is rather archaic. The latter one is more commonly in use. The focus has changed from territory (“sho”) to life (“shō”). Just like the evolution of these two words, the mentality could change, from focusing on the solid territory to the mobile life. Even though, we are still so very pinned down to territoriality, at least in East Asia.

As you know, I come from Kobe. The city suffered severely from the terrible Hanshin earthquake in 1995. The citizens of Kobe physically felt the end of solid territoriality. It was not only from the collapse of buildings or the massive fires which burnt down the entire town, but also from the liquefaction of the land itself.

Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman coined the term “Liquid modernity”, the liquefaction of solid territoriality has since become an important point on the agenda of the current world. However, people from Kobe could express the vanity of the territoriality in different ways.

Yet, whether in East Asia or in Europe, day by day the human world is becoming more and more “liquefied” under the massive progress of transportation and communication technologies. We should reconsider the idea of living in the “happy

birdcage” by constructing the regional union insofar as it is based at the expense of isolation or rejection of the outside world.

2. Freedom of human movement and conservation of regional or local culture: The antimony of promoting both liquefaction and solidification

Up to this point, I’ve discussed the external territorial limitation in general. Then, how is the view from within the EU?

This approach is fascinating for us, because, the challenging ambition to cope with foreseeable trials is quite daring. Among these ambitious trials, I would like to point out the free movement of goods and even human movement, as provided by the Schengen Agreement. It is almost startling from an East Asian perspective, where the intolerant and base hearted nationalism and linked exclusivism is getting harder in this century. For us, who consider Modern Europe the cradle of nation-states and a territorial governance system, with a tough border control, it seems like a Copernican turn.

Europe is home to a rich diversity of national languages. Nevertheless, from the very beginning, the EU has been taking earnest measures to ensure co-existence between these many languages. For example, cross interpretation and translation networks are kept in the European Parliament² and the EU commission. And for EU citizens, there have been a number of programs established that foster and promote language exchange within educational and work contexts, including the Erasmus Programme for international student exchange in higher education, the Leonardo da Vinci Programme for the increase mobility of the younger labour force through borderless skill education, the Comenius Programme for the improvement and increase in mobility of pupils and educational staff across the EU and even the Grundtvig Programme for internationalized life-long education. Within the scope of the Grundtvig Programme, the EU clarified its aim to “improve conditions for mobility so that at least 7,000 people per year by 2013 can benefit from adult education abroad”³. The human resource training system provided to EU citizens, no matter how young or old, illustrates the EU’s commitment to create mobility within the EU area.

Promoting freedom of human movement or instigating a “liquefaction of society” is inextricably linked to the abandonment of territoriality or, to put it plainly, the abandonment of nationality, of the nation-states. Such territoriality originated from the agricultural dependant existence, founded and extended by the governance of the fields

that feed us. The value of real estate also derives from the concept of territoriality. Thus, the territoriality has its basic roots long back beyond the Middle Ages, not just to the “Solid Modern” which is highly organized in nation-states. Albeit, to the remorse of some of Europe’s recent History chapters, to determine identities based on racial or physical aspects of human beings attributed to the locality is avoided (For example, like Italy>Italian or Paris>Parisian), even though these might still be regarded as fairly reliable. Such discretion of the criteria to determine identities may come from geographical facts. In other words, these identities are endorsed by territoriality. It is quite astonishing that the European society in which such identification was cradled determined to esteem the universal and personal human rights, duly departing from territoriality or nationality.

However, on many other points, the same EU is implementing policies in the opposite direction, especially with regard to cultural matters in the EU area. One such example is the policy of “regional and minority languages”.

My field of expertise is on minority languages particularly from historical and sociological perspectives. My specific area of interest is the Northeast of Portugal, where the Mirandese language is spoken. The southern foot of the Pyrenean Mountains where the Aragonese language is spoken, the southern part of the Italian Peninsula and Sicily Island with its minority languages are also places that I have been investigating.

These are remote and peripheral regions in southern Europe, chosen because I believe learning could be drawn on how best to promote minority languages in the Japanese Archipelago.

Apart from the Ainu and Ryukyu languages, which are greatly different from standard Japanese, there is not a great deal of linguistic diversity in the Japanese islands. Nonetheless, in Kobe, where Kobe University is located, *Kansai-ben* is widely spoken, which has totally different intonation system and its own original vocabulary. Like Britain, Sardinia or Sicily Island in Europe, in Japan, each island has multilayered linguistic diversity in its own island.

This is how I came to be interested in ways to promote minority languages in Europe and how to apply them in our own linguistic diversity. And yet, one thing twists my mind:

I am profoundly concerned about the choice of the terms *Regional and Minority Languages/ Regional or Minority Languages* which are widely used in the EU and the Council of Europe. These wordings are used in the fundamental principles related to

these subjects. For instance, the Council of Europe had promulgated the “ECRML”, namely, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. In these documents, we are informed that the minority languages without territoriality do not fall under the scope of the promotion of linguistic diversity except the “traditional” migrant languages, namely the Roma Language and the Yiddish language.

Yet, as a matter of course, those who most directly promote minority languages are their speakers. In the EU, as already discussed, each EU citizen is offered the principle of freedom of movement, and recommended to live under these standards of conduct. Then there is a contradictory scheme, which is made by the minority languages with solid territoriality and their speakers with liquid mobility.

In many cases, the minority languages remain at the periphery of nation-states, for example, Breton, Welsh or the Friesland language. However, the original distribution areas of these languages are located relatively near to the centre of economical activities, roughly 2-3 hours travel by public transportation. Thus, there is a small chance that the local population will decrease sharply. The native speakers may be able to reside at their original area and commute to the cities where there is a high concentration of businesses. One problem is that there is linguistic pressure from non-native speakers who immigrated because they want to live a rural life. Meanwhile, there are possibilities to oblige them and their children to learn the local language if they would like to live there, as some autonomous regional governments in Spain are managing under the notion of “linguistic normalization”, though I doubt if such political attitude could be accepted ethically (and may only become an imitation and repetition of those conventional language policies instituted by nation-states in order to spread mono-cultural standard language).

The remote mountain areas in southern Europe, however, which are the areas I am referring to, have a totally different social situation. If a native speaker were to travel outside the original distribution area to big cities in order to find a job, using their own rights of freedom of movement, it is not likely to appear complementary to any persons whether native or non-native. Through the effects of such massive rural exodus and then the absolute social desertification, those of the regional language may view the minority languages as merely a name or title. Nevertheless, such tendency can be observed easily not only in specific minority languages but also the local culture in general, in remote areas (whether in Europe or in East Asia).

From observing such situations, it must be high time to apply the principle of freedom of movement to the promotion of minority languages. Thus, if there are speakers of a minority language in Paris, these speakers should have the right to speak and to educate their children to learn the minority language.

The above mentioned system, however, would create the following dilemmas from a practical perspective:

1) There is a need for sufficient human and financial resources to maintain the right to promote minority languages in big cities. However this would be logically innumerable as it is already problematic for the management of just national languages across the EU countries.

2) Admitting regional and minority languages that were originally distributed across EU countries would inevitably mean the EU would have to recognize the linguistic rights of all immigrants including those from the outside of the EU area, because it would be unfair to select and limit the possibility of promotion of minority languages in big cities, only by their original distribution area, even though speakers are living close together.

Therefore, it is very important to further seek effective ways to promote minority languages. I guess there are other clues to creating a third way in the historical experiences in East Asia.

Conclusion

The promotion of free movement to citizens in the EU is the role of the human rights for all EU citizens. However, regarding the social liquefaction of the whole planet, is it enough to move freely only in the territory of EU? It may be important not to give up looking for the “portability” of similar human rights elsewhere in the world, because it would be a point of harmonization between the least “Human Security” and the actual mobility of human beings. If so, it would be quite important for the EU to try to reject the walls and barriers which are put around its borders in order to show the advantages of integration of former nation-states systems and make efforts to direct an open society throughout the world.

So, how about East Asia? East Asia is in a miserable situation. It is as if there were only the “best” (or obedient) students, who have learnt about international relations from textbooks edited in the early 20th century during the age of imperialism. We are

trapped listening day-by-day to the media’s monotonous and nationalistic hegemony theory. There are a variety of arguments concerning the “East Asia Community” or the “TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership”; however, such discussions concentrate on the economic benefits only. If someone claimed to make human mobility (apart from tourism subjects⁴) easier, others would no doubt brand them as a public enemy. In political sense, I do not know if it is possible to measure how far behind Europe we are.

East Asia, like Europe, mainly consisted of agrarian societies where issues of territoriality have been quite conscious. However, before imitating the nation-state system of the western world that arose in the middle 19th century, they had a way to resolve or absorb the inter-regional tension supported by the wide neutral zones among such regional powers. In a way, among them there were flexible systems to forestall the conflicts. Nowadays, however, such wide neutral zones are duly divided by the rigid borders and have become a remote periphery of each country.

Concerning communication, in East Asia, there were the common written communication (“Hitsudan”) manners of “Kanbun”, which are written sentences written in Chinese characters, and the oral communication was separated by such manner. By this system, the diversity of speech could be much more “portable” even in a community of different languages⁵ than cultural spheres that use the alphabetical system, since it is only able to represent standard and normative voices. Thus, the “Kanbun” system could fit the liquefied society, especially though the digital use, though it would be necessary to simplify to act as a “written Pidgin”.

In the end, it is worth stressing that it is necessary for East Asia and Europe to continue discussions about the way to survive in an actual liquefied society; that is one which is not able to cope with territoriality principles.

Notes:

¹ Please note that there are differences between the notion of territoriality in sociological and legal terms. (The conventional laws are always set up by (sociological) territoriality principle, because they normally have an effective area, limited by the national/regional/municipal legislative competence.

SOCIOLOGICAL Terms	Principle of Territoriality (and/or Nationality)	<i>Conventional Legal Terms</i>	<i>Territoriality Principle</i> <i>Nationality Principle</i> <i>Passive Personality Principle</i> <i>Protective Principle</i>
	(Universal) Principle of Personality / Non-Territoriality Principle		

² <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0912/p05s01-woeu.html> (linked Jan 10, 2011)

³ http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-programme/doc86_en.htm (linked Jan 10, 2011)

⁴ Though tourism contact seems superficial, it could be a breakthrough for bilateral relations and even could be leverage for the equalization of human rights among countries.

⁵ For example, intellectuals from Kyoto could communicate by written “Kanbun” in Changan (長安, the capital of the Tang Dynasty) without knowing the real pronunciation of Changan mandarin (a case from the 8th Century). Such a system was also adaptable to the case between intellectuals of Nagasaki and Ninpo (寧波)

波), though the pronunciation system of each local language is quite different from that of each capital's local language (a case from the 17th Century).

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